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Abstract The Reference Principle (RP) states that co-referring expressions are
everywhere intersubstitutable salva congruitate. On first glance, (RP) looks like a
truism, but a truism with some bite: (RP) transforms difficult philosophical ques-
tions about co-reference into easy grammatical questions about substitutability. This
has led a number of philosophers to think that we can use (RP) to make short work
of certain longstanding metaphysical debates. For example, it has been suggested
that all we need to do to show that the predicate ‘( ) is a horse’ does not refer to a
property is point out that ‘( ) is a horse’ and ‘the property of being a horse’ are not
everywhere intersubstitutable salva congruitate. However, when we understand
‘substitution’ in the simplest and most straightforward way, (RP) is no truism; in
fact, natural languages are full of counterexamples to the principle. In this paper, I
introduce a new notion of substitution, and then develop and argue for a version of
(RP) that is immune to these counterexamples. Along the way I touch on the
following topics: the relation between argument forms and their natural language
instances; the reification of sense; the difference between terms and predicates; and
the relation between reference and disquotation. I end by arguing that my new
version of (RP) cannot be used to settle metaphysical debates quite as easily as some
philosophers would like.
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It is always tempting to look for shortcuts in philosophy, for easy answers to difficult
questions. Here are two examples of a shortcut that some philosophers have tried:
Easy Argument 1: Properties
Do predicates refer to properties? Well, if the predicate ‘ð Þ is a horse’ refers to a
property, then it must surely refer to the property of being a horse. And in that
case, ‘ð Þ is a horse’ and ‘the property of being a horse’ must co-refer. But co-
referring expressions are everywhere intersubstitutable salva congruitate. (In
other words, if two expressions co-refer then substituting the one for the other can
never turn a grammatical sentence into an ungrammatical one.) ‘ð Þ is a horse’
and ‘the property of being a horse’ are not everywhere intersubstitutable salva
congruitate: ‘Shergar is a horse’ is a grammatical sentence, but ‘Shergar the
property of being a horse’ is not. So ‘ð Þ is a horse’ does not co-refer with ‘the
property of being a horse’, and thus ‘ð Þ is a horse’ does not refer to a property.1
Easy Argument 2: Propositions
Are propositional attitudes relations to propositions? Take the sentence ‘Sharon
hopes that the show will be funny’. If this sentence says that Sharon bears the
relation of hoping to the proposition that the show will be funny, then ‘that the
show will be funny’ must surely refer to that proposition. And in that case, ‘that
the show will be funny’ must co-refer with ‘the proposition that the show will be
funny’. But again, these expressions are not everywhere intersubstitutable salva
congruitate: ‘Sharon hopes that the show will be funny’ is a grammatical
sentence, but ‘Sharon hopes the proposition that the show will be funny’ is not.
So ‘that the show will be funny’ does not refer to a proposition in ‘Sharon hopes
that the show will be funny’, and thus the propositional attitude of hoping, at
least, is not a relation to a proposition.2
These easy arguments crucially rely upon the Reference Principle:
(RP) Co-referring expressions are everywhere intersubstitutable salva
congruitate.3
Of course, that is not all that these arguments rely upon. For example, Easy
Argument 1 presumes that if ‘ð Þ is a horse’ refers to a property, then that property
1 This argument is given by Wright in his (1998: pp. 73, 85–90); however, Wright (pp. 86–88) tempers
its conclusion by insisting that although predicates do not refer to properties, they do ‘ascribe’ them.
Moltmann offers a related argument in her (2003a: Sect. 3).
2 For this and related arguments, see: Bach (1997: p. 225), McKinsey (1999: pp. 530–531), Moltmann
(2003b: Sect. 2.1), Rosefeldt (2008: Sect. 3).
3 The name ‘the Reference Principle’ is due to Wright (1998: p. 73). In fact, my Reference Principle is
just one half of Wright’s; however, it is the only half that is needed for the arguments presented above. It
is also worth mentioning that Hale and Wright use ‘the Reference Principle’ for something quite different
in their (2012: p. 93).
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can also be referred to by a singular term, and that presumption can be challenged.4
Nonetheless, (RP) is clearly the driving force behind these easy arguments; it
transforms difficult philosophical questions about co-reference into easy grammat-
ical questions about intersubstitutability. What is more, (RP) initially appears to be a
truism. Indeed, at first we really want to demand something stronger: co-referring
expressions should not just be everywhere intersubstitutable salva congruitate, but
salva veritate as well! Most of us eventually abandon this stronger demand when we
are confronted with the stubborn intensionality of natural language, but still,
intensionality does not seem to do anything to threaten the minimal salva
congruitate requirement.
So it seems that (RP) is an uncontentious principle which makes quick work of
knotty philosophical questions. This all sounds too good to be true. And of course, it
is. In his (2005), Oliver offers a number of examples designed to show that far from
being a truism, (RP) is demonstrably false.5 For now it will suffice to focus on just
two of Oliver’s examples. First, take the sentence,
(1a) Brilliant Bertrand solved a paradox.
‘Bertrand’ and ‘the referent of ‘‘Bertrand’’ ’ co-refer,6 but the result of substituting
‘the referent of ‘‘Bertrand’’ ’ for ‘Bertrand’ in (1a),
(1b) Brilliant the referent of ‘Bertrand’ solved a paradox,
is an ungrammatical muddle of words. Second, take the sentence,
(2a) I am Robert.
‘I’ and ‘me’ co-refer in any given context, but again, the result of substituting ‘me’
for ‘I’ in (2a),
(2b) Me am Robert,
is at very least not the Queen’s English.7
What are we to make of these counterexamples to (RP)? Well, they both rely on a
particular conception of substitution, which I will call simple-substitution.
According to this conception, we substitute one expression for another by (almost
literally) cutting out the latter and pasting the former in its place. (This is the sort of
substitution that you can use the Find and Replace function on a word processor to
do.) Oliver has therefore presented counterexamples to the following precisified
version of (RP):
4 In fact, it should be challenged. See Trueman (2015).
5 Similar examples are given by Schiffer (2003: pp. 92–95).
6 Or at least they do on the assumption that ‘Bertrand’ and ‘the referent of ‘‘Bertrand’’ ’ are referring
singular terms. As MacBride (2011: pp. 302–304) points out, this assumption can be challenged.
However, for the purposes of this paper, I will happily concede to Oliver that ‘Bertrand’ and ‘the referent
of ‘‘Bertrand’’ ’ are referring singular terms.
7 Rosefeldt’s (2008: p. 309) supposedly fixed version of (RP) is not immune to this counterexample.
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(RP1) Co-referring expressions are everywhere simple-intersubstitutable salva
congruitate.
Now, we cannot criticise Oliver for being uncharitable when he interprets (RP) as
(RP1): the conception of substitution involved in the easy arguments certainly seems
to be simple-substitution. Nonetheless, we might wonder whether this really is the
best way to interpret (RP). While simple-substitution may be appropriate for well
designed formal languages, it is surely too simple when it comes to messy natural
languages. My aim in this paper is to present an alternative conception of
substitution. I will then develop and argue for a version of (RP) that is immune to
Oliver’s counterexamples. Finally, at the very end of the paper, I will return to the
easy arguments with which we began; as we will see, when we rest these arguments
on my new version of (RP), they become a lot less easy.
2 Sense-substitution
Consider the following argument:
(i) Robert is hungry
(ii) I am Robert
; (iii) I am hungry
This argument is obviously valid. Indeed, I would say that it is a natural language
instance of the following valid argument form:
(SI) Fa; b ¼ a; ) Fb.
However, the validity of (SI) crucially turns on our substituting ‘b’ for ‘a’ in ‘Fa’. So
if (i)–(iii) is to be an instance of (SI), then (iii) must in some sense count as a result of
substituting ‘I’ for ‘Robert’ in (i). And clearly, we do not have a case of simple-
substitution here. As we move from (i) via (ii) to (iii), we do not unthinkingly write
‘I’ into the gap in ‘ð Þ is hungry’. Rather, we swap ‘ð Þ is hungry’ for ‘ð Þ am
hungry’, and then write ‘I’ into that gap instead. Moreover, in making this swap we in
no way impugn the validity of the argument. As far as the argument is concerned, (iii)
really is a result of substituting ‘I’ for ‘Robert’ in (i). What we must now ask, then, is:
Why should (iii) count as a result of this substitution?
I would like to propose the following answer: Because ‘ð Þ am hungry’ and ‘ð Þ
is hungry’ have the same sense, in something like Frege’s sense of ‘sense’. As Frege
thought of it, the sense of a sentence (which I will also call a proposition)
determines the logical properties of that sentence,8 and the sense of a subsentential
expression is that expression’s contribution to the senses of the sentences in which it
8 In fact, Frege (e.g. 1906: pp. 318, 332) made the stronger claim that logical relations hold primarily
between propositions, and only derivatively between sentences; for Frege (1918: pp. 334–347),
propositions are abstract objects, and it is these abstract objects that are the primary relata of logical




appears.9 So the idea here is that the grammatical difference between ‘ð Þ am
hungry’ and ‘ð Þ is hungry’ does not reflect a difference in the contributions that
these expressions make to the senses of the sentences in which they appear. If that is
right, then we can explain why (i)–(iii) should count as an instance of (SI): ‘ð Þ is
hungry’ and ‘ð Þ am hungry’ make exactly the same contribution to the senses of
(i) and (iii), and it is those senses that determine the logical properties of those
sentences.
More certainly needs to be said about the notion of sense appealed to in this
answer, and I will try to say more in Sect. 4. For now, though, I would ask the
reader to go with my answer, if only to see where it leads: (iii) counts as a result of
substituting ‘I’ for ‘Robert’ in (i) because ‘ð Þ am hungry’ has the same sense as
‘ð Þ is hungry’.10 This suggests that there is a conception of substitution according
to which the following is true:
WðbÞ is a result of substituting b for the displayed occurrence of a in UðaÞ
whenever Wð Þ  Uð Þ,11
where ‘’ is shorthand for ‘has the same sense as’, and ‘the displayed occurrence of
a in UðaÞ’ is shorthand for ‘the occurrence of a in UðaÞ that fills the gap in Uð Þ’.
The ‘displayed occurrence’ clause is strictly necessary, since there may be other
occurrences of a in UðaÞ, but for the sake of readability I will often leave it implicit.
Now consider this argument:
(iv) Tim helped Robert with a paper
(v) I am Robert
; (vi) Tim helped me with a paper
Again, this argument is obviously valid, and again I would say that it is a natural
language instance of (SI). But as we move from (iv) via (v) to (vi), we do not
unthinkingly write ‘I’ into the gap in ‘Tim helped ð Þ with a paper’. This time, we
swap ‘I’ for ‘me’ and write that into the gap instead. Moreover, in making this swap
we in no way impugn the validity of the argument. As far as the argument is
concerned, (vi) really is a result of substituting ‘I’ for ‘Robert’ in (iv). And now, of
course, what we must ask is: Why should (vi) count as a result of this substitution?
I would like to propose the following answer: Because ‘I’ and ‘me’ have the
same sense (in any given context, at least).12 Again, the idea is that the grammatical
difference between ‘I’ and ‘me’ does not reflect a difference in the contributions that
9 See (Frege 1893: Sect. 32). Here and elsewhere (e.g. 1923: p. 390), Frege uses a mereological
metaphor: he says that the sense of a part of a sentence is a part of the sense of that sentence. I do not find
that metaphor very helpful, not least because it encourages us to think of senses as objects.
10 I am by no means suggesting that this is the only possible answer. I discuss an alternative in the
‘‘Appendix’’.
11 If we were being fastidious, we would put Quine-quotes around ‘WðbÞ’ and ‘UðaÞ’. However, Quine-
quotes tend to make things harder to understand, and so I will only use them when I really have to. For the
rest of the time, we should just imagine that Quine-quotes are already built into the Greek variables.
12 From now on, I will leave the ‘in any given context’ qualification tacit.
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these expressions make to the senses of the sentences in which they appear.13 If that
is right, then we can explain why (iv)–(vi) should count as an instance of (SI): ‘I’
and ‘me’ make exactly the same contribution to the senses of the sentences in which
they appear, and so for logical purposes we are free to swap between them as
grammar demands. This suggests that there is a conception of substitution according
to which the following is true:
UðcÞ is a result of substituting b for the displayed occurrence of a in UðaÞ
whenever c  b.
Putting these answers together, I would like to introduce the following
conception of substitution, which I will call sense-substitution:
To sense-substitute b for the displayed occurrence of a in a meaningful sentence
UðaÞ is to construct a meaningful sentence WðcÞ such that:
(a) Wð Þ  Uð Þ
and (b) c  b.
We will work through some examples of sense-substitution in the next section, but
for now we can explain the guiding idea like this. Simple-substitution is appropriate
when we are interested in the straightforward substitution of expressions thought of
as ink marks on a page (or lights on a computer screen, or whatever). Sense-
substitution, on the other hand, is the conception to use when we are interested in
the substitution of senses, not ink marks. Of course, we cannot directly substitute
one sense for another; all we can really do is substitute one expression for another.
But when we are interested in the senses of these expressions, we can simply
disregard what they look like. Whether WðcÞ counts as a result of sense-substituting
b for a in UðaÞ has nothing to do with typography. Wð Þ and Uð Þ do not need to
share any typographic similarity, and neither do c and b. All that matters is that
Wð Þ have the same sense as Uð Þ, and c have the same sense as b.
13 Of course, this does not mean that differences in case are pointless grammatical flourishes. Like word
order, case helps to determine which terms fill which argument places in a given predicate. Or to use the
language of thematic roles: case helps to determine which term refers to the Agent of the relation
expressed by the given predicate, which to the Patient, which to the Instrument, and so on. Indeed, it
seems to me that the suggestion that differences in case do not reflect differences in sense can be made to
fit very well with a thematic-role analysis. On one such analysis, the sentences (a) ‘I phoned Sharon’ and
(b) ‘Sharon phoned me’ become (a0) ‘9eðphoningðeÞ ^Agentði; eÞ ^ Patient(s, e))’ and (b0) ‘9eðphon-
ingðeÞ ^Agentðs; eÞ ^ Patient(i, e))’. The idea that ‘I’ and ‘me’ have the same sense in (a) and (b) is borne
out here by the fact that both of these terms are formalised as ‘i’ in (a0) and (b0); the difference in case
simply tells us whether ‘i’ appears in ‘Agentð ; eÞ’ or in ‘Patientð ; eÞ’. For an introduction to thematic-
role analysis, and the hypothesised link between thematic roles and grammatical roles (often called
UTAH), see: Larson and Segal (1995: Sect. 12.3), Heim and Kratzer (1998: pp. 49–58).
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3 A new Reference Principle
We can use the notion of sense-substitution to give a new precisification of (RP):
(RP2) Co-referring expressions are everywhere sense-intersubstitutable.
Conspicuously, I have not included a ‘salva congruitate’ clause in (RP2). This is
because sense-substitution is defined only over meaningful sentences: in the
definition of sense-substitution, I stipulated that UðaÞ and WðcÞ be meaningful
sentences. I made this stipulation because sense-substitution is meant to give us a
way of substituting one sense in a proposition for another, and only meaningful
sentences express propositions. (RP2) should therefore be understood as follows: if
a and b co-refer, then there is no occurrence of a in a meaningful sentence such that
it is impossible to construct another meaningful sentence that counts as a result of
sense-substituting b for that occurrence of a. Read in this way, there is no need to
include an extra ‘salva congruitate’ clause.
(RP2) can be defended from Oliver’s counterexamples. Let us again start with,
(1a) Brilliant Bertrand solved a paradox.
According to (RP2), since ‘Bertrand’ co-refers with ‘the referent of ‘‘Bertrand’’ ’, it
should be possible to sense-substitute the latter for the former in (1a). My suggestion
is that the following counts as a result of this sense-substitution:
(1c) The referent of ‘Bertrand’ is brilliant and solved a paradox.
(1c) is a result of this sense-substitution if:
(a) ‘ð Þ is brilliant and solved a paradox’  ‘Brilliant ð Þ solved a
paradox’
and (b) ‘the referent of ‘‘Bertrand’’ ’  ‘the referent of ‘‘Bertrand’’ ’.
(a) strikesmeas plausible,14 andwecan take (b) for granted;more generally,we can take
it for granted that every expression has the same sense as itself.15 However, it is worth
noting that I am suggesting only that (1c) is a, not the, result of this sense-substitution.
Unlike simple-substitution, more than one sentence can count as a result of sense-
substituting one expression for another. Take the following sentence for example:
(1d) The thing to which ‘Bertrand’ refers is brilliant and solved a paradox.
Presumably, ‘the thing to which ‘‘Bertrand’’ refers’ has the same sense as ‘the
referent of ‘‘Bertrand’’ ’. If so, (1c) is a result of sense-substituting ‘the referent of
‘‘Bertrand’’ ’ for ‘Bertrand’ in (1a) if and only if (1d) is as well.
14 On one way of reading (1a). Alternatively, we might read (1a) as saying of brilliant Bertrand that he
solved a paradox. On this alternative reading, (1a) is equivalent to ‘The thing that is brilliant and identical
to Bertrand solved a paradox’. If we read (1a) in this way, then we should obviously give the following
instead of (1c): The thing that is brilliant and identical to the referent of ‘Bertrand’ solved a paradox. Or
more colloquially: The brilliant referent of ‘Bertrand’ solved a paradox.
15 More generally still, I will assume that has the same sense as is an equivalence relation over meaningful
expressions. This is obviously a simplifying idealisation; see Sect. 4.3 for a very brief discussion.
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We turn now to,
(2a) I am Robert.
According to (RP2), since ‘I’ co-refers with ‘me’, it should be possible to sense-
substitute the latter for the former in (2a). I would like to suggest that (2a) is itself a
result of sense-substituting ‘me’ for ‘I’ in (2a). (2a) counts as a result of this sense-
substitution if:
(a) ‘ð Þ am Robert’  ‘ð Þ am Robert’
and (b) ‘I’  ‘me’.
In this case it is (a) that we can take for granted, and (b) that is plausible. So, it
seems, (2a) is a result of sense-substituting ‘me’ for ‘I’ in (2a). In other words,
substituting ‘me’ for ‘I’ is a limiting case of sense-substitution, like substituting ‘I’
for ‘I’ or ‘Bertrand’ for ‘Bertrand’.16 Again, I am claiming only that (2a) is a result
of sense-substituting ‘me’ for ‘I’ in (2a). In fact, there is no reason to limit our
attention to English sentences when looking for results of this sense-substitution.
Consider the French sentence,
(2c) Je suis Robert.
This sentence is a result of sense-substituting ‘me’ for ‘I’ in (2a) if:
(a) ‘ð Þ suis Robert’  ‘ð Þ am Robert’
and (b) ‘Je’  ‘me’.
(a) looks like a safe assumption; certainly, ‘ð Þ suis Robert’ is the French translation
of ‘ð Þ am Robert’, and while translation may not always preserve sense, it is hard
to see what the difference could be in this case. As for (b), ‘Je’ is the French
translation of ‘I’, and again it seems reasonable to say that in this case, translation
preserves sense; if we add to this the earlier assumption that ‘I’ and ‘me’ also have
the same sense, we can infer (b).17 In short, then, (2a) is a result of sense-
substituting ‘me’ for ‘I’ in (2a) if and only if (2c) is as well.
This brings us to an important point. When we ask whether one expression can be
sense-substituted for another, the modality we have in mind should be a very
permissive one. We should be asking whether it is in principle possible for there to
be a sentence which counts as a result of this sense-substitution. After all, sense-
substitution is meant to give us a way of substituting senses in propositions. So,
saying that b can be sense-substituted for a in UðaÞ is meant to capture the idea that
we can substitute the sense of b for the sense of a in the proposition expressed by
UðaÞ. It should not matter, then, if the proposition that results from this substitution
of senses cannot be expressed in the same language as UðaÞ. It should not even
matter if it cannot be expressed in any of the languages that anyone has ever actually
spoken. All that matters is that it is in principle possible to construct a sentence that
16 I first got the idea that substituting ‘me’ for ‘I’ might be a limiting case of substitution from Dolby
(2009: p. 291).
17 I am again idealising by assuming that has the same sense as is an equivalence relation, and hence
transitive, over meaningful expressions; again, see Sect. 4.3.
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expresses the proposition, even if doing so involves inventing a whole new
language. Of course, it is a very nice question exactly how we should characterise
this permissive modality, but I hope that I have said enough for present purposes. In
what follows, then, I will understand the modality involved in ‘sense-intersubsti-
tutable’ in this permissive sort of way.
This point is related to a counterexample to (RP1) that we have not yet
considered. ‘Frege’ co-refers with ‘Der Autor der Grundlagen der Arithmetik’, and
so (RP1) entails that they are everywhere simple-intersubstitutable salva congrui-
tate. However, whereas,
(3a) Frege was a philosopher,
is a grammatical English sentence,
(3b) Der Autor der Grundlagen der Arithmetik was a philosopher,
is not a grammatical sentence in English or German. This is another of Oliver’s
(2005: p. 186) counterexamples, but he does not put too much weight on it. As he
concedes, it can be disarmed by restricting (RP1) so that it applies to only one
language at a time; what the counterexample shows is just that (RP1) should not be
taken to imply that co-referring expressions taken from different languages are
everywhere intersubstitutable salva congruitate. However, this clash of languages
does nothing to stop us sense-substituting ‘Der Autor der Grundlagen der
Arithmetik’ for ‘Frege’ in (3a). ‘The author of The Foundations of Arithmetic’
presumably has the same sense as ‘Der Autor der Grundlagen der Arithmetik’, and
so one result of the sense-substitution will be:
(3c) The author of The Foundations of Arithmetic was a philosopher.
And assuming that the German predicate ‘ð Þ war ein Philosoph’ has the same sense
as the English predicate ‘ð Þ was a philosopher’, another result will be:
(3d) Der Autor der Grundlagen der Arithmetik war ein Philosoph.
And of course, there will be plenty of other results of this substitution, not just in
German and English, but in innumerable other languages as well. (RP2) need not, then,
be restricted to one language at a time. More than that, it should not be: again, to say
that b can be sense-substituted for a in UðaÞ is meant to capture the idea that we can
substitute the sense of b for the sense of a in the proposition expressed byUðaÞ, and so
it really should not matter whether a and b belong to the same language. I will, then,
take (RP2) to apply simultaneously to all languages, including merely possible ones.
In summary, (RP2) is not vulnerable to any of Oliver’s counterexamples to (RP1).
Or at least, not obviously vulnerable.18 It is impossible to miss the slightly hesitant
tone running throughout the discussion so far. I have made lots of ‘safe
18 In fact, even this is a stronger claim than I have any right to make. Oliver offers a dizzying array of
counterexamples to (RP1), and I have only presented those that I find most compelling. Of course, it goes
without saying that I think that (RP2) can also be defended from the rest of Oliver’s counterexamples, but
unfortunately, I do not have the space to discuss them here.
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assumptions’ and ‘plausible suggestions’ about whether one expression has the
same sense as another. And really, I cannot be more definitive than that. It is
notoriously difficult to show once and for all that two expressions have exactly the
same sense. The difficulties here are in part philosophical—just how finely grained
should our concept of sense be?—but also in part empirical: demonstrating that two
expressions share a sense will certainly require a close examination of how those
expressions are actually used. It is, then, far beyond the means of this paper to
announce once and for all that (1c) is a result of sense-substituting ‘the referent of
‘‘Bertrand’’ ’ for ‘Bertrand’ in (1a), or that (2a) is itself a result of sense-substituting
‘me’ for ‘I’ in (2a), and so on through the other examples. Nonetheless, what I have
said is enough to undermine Oliver’s counterexamples, taken as counterexamples to
(RP2) rather than (RP1). As of yet we have been given no reason to suspect that
there might be co-referring expressions that are not everywhere sense-
intersubstitutable.
Still, it would be nice not to end on such an uncertain note. I will, therefore,
spend most of what remains of this paper working towards a general argument for a
version of (RP). But before starting on that work, I would like to deal with a
different objection to (RP2), namely the objection that there is something suspect
about the notion of sense in sense-substitution.
4 The sense in sense-substitution
There are two different kinds of worry that you might have about my appeal to
sense: first, you might have a general worry about the whole idea of sense, and
second, you might have a particular worry about the details of my appeal to sense. In
this section I will try to answer both kinds of worry.
4.1 The general worry: the very idea of sense
In Sect. 2 I made it clear that I was working with a broadly Fregean notion of sense,
and I am sure that that will have set alarm bells ringing for some readers. But I think
that we can address this sort of worry simply by emphasising the ‘broadly’ in
‘broadly Fregean’. I have so far made only two substantial assumptions about
sense:19 first, that the sense of a sentence determines the logical properties of that
sentence, and second, that the sense of a subsentential expression is that
expression’s contribution to the senses of the sentences in which it appears. And
while it is true that I took both of these assumptions from Frege, they are hardly
peculiarly Fregean. Accepting them certainly does not force us to accept any of
Frege’s more controversial claims about sense. This point is well illustrated by the
following example. One of Frege’s most famous doctrines is that (even simple)
singular terms can co-refer and yet have different senses (1892: pp. 151–152). Now,
19 So far? In Sect. 6 I will make some further claims about the senses of singular terms, first-level
predicates and second-level predicates. However, I think that these further claims should be seen as
substantial assumptions about terms and predicates, not about sense.
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I am inclined to agree with Frege on this issue, but for all I have said in this paper, it
may be that co-referring (simple) singular terms automatically share a sense, i.e.
automatically make the same contribution to the senses of the sentences in which
they appear.
I hope that this already goes some way towards easing the general worry that one
might have about my appeal to sense, but I would like to go further. Frege (1892: p.
154, 1918: pp. 334–337) thought that senses were objects; that is, Frege thought that
senses could be referred to with singular terms. However, some philosophers (e.g.
McDowell 1977) think that it is amistake to reify senses in this way. This is not to deny
that one expression can have the same sense as another. It is just to deny that what it is
for a to have the same sense as b is for a and b to stand in the having relation to the
same special object, which we call their ‘sense’. Instead, to say that a has the same
sense as b is just a flowery way of saying that a is synonymous with b (for logical
purposes at least). It is important to observe, then, that my definition of sense-
substitution does not treat senses as if theywere objects: sense is onlymentioned in the
course of saying that one expression has the same sense as another.20
At this point it might be objected that whilemy definition of sense-substitution does
not treat senses as objects, my less formal remarks about sense do. In fact, my two
assumptions about sense are cases in point: I assumed that the sense of a sentence
determines the logical properties of that sentence, and that the sense of a subsentential
expression is that expression’s contribution to the senses of the sentences in which it
appears. However, it is my belief that we can offer explanations—or more accurately:
explications—of everything I say about sense that do not treat senses as objects.
Again, take my two assumptions about sense as examples. It is relatively easy to offer
an explication of the claim that the sense of a sentence determines that sentence’s
logical properties: if two sentences have the same sense, then they have the same
logical properties.21 It is a little harder to offer an explication of the claim that the
sense of a subsentential expression is its contribution to the senses of the sentences in
which it appears, but here is a start: subsentential expressions a and b have the same
sense if and only if substituting b for a in a sentence always produces a sentence with
the same sense as the original, and vice versa.22
20 The one point in the definition at which this is not absolutely explicit is when I stipulate that UðaÞ and
WðcÞ are meaningful sentences; however, we can understand the claim that a sentence is meaningful as
the claim that it has the same sense as itself.
21 Importantly, this does not automatically imply that two sentences have the same sense just in case they
entail each other. To begin with, all that is being claimed here is that sentences with the same sense have
the same logical properties, not that sentences with the same logical properties also have the same sense.
And perhaps more interestingly, even if we did want to say that sentences with the same logical properties
have the same sense, we could still insist that sentences have logical properties that cannot be reduced to
entailment. For example, we might like to say that if a sentence is a conjunction of two other sentences,
then that is a logical property of that sentence. In that case, ‘Snow is white’ will have different logical
properties from ‘Snow is white and snow is white’, even though these sentences entail each other.
22 I mean it when I say that this is a start. Here is a better attempt. Subsentential expressions a and b have
the same sense iff for any UðcÞ: (a) there exists a result of substituting a for c in UðcÞ iff there exists a
result of substituting b for c in UðcÞ; and (b) every result of substituting a for c in UðcÞ has the same sense
as every result of substituting b for c in UðcÞ. However, to keep the discussion simple, I will work with
the rougher explication given in the main text; nothing will turn on this decision to keep things simple.
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But if it really is possible forme to say everything Iwant to saywithout appearing to
reify senses, thenwhy don’t I?Whydo I insist on speaking as ifwe could refer to senses
with singular terms? There are two answers to this question, one shallower and one
deeper. The shallower answer is this: if I steadfastly refused to speak as if we could
refer to senses with terms, this paper would become so unwieldy and complex that it
would be impossible to understand. Even including all of the necessary explications in
parentheses or footnotes would prove impractical, and so for the most part I will leave
it as an exercise for the reader to come up with them as needed. The deeper answer is
this: part of the point of this paper is to explicate some of our talk that apparently reifies
senses. On the face of it, we can only talk about substituting senses if propositions are
complex objects made up of senses; however, we can use my definition of sense-
substitution to explicate this sort of talk without treating senses as objects. Crucially,
though, I could not offer this explication unless I started by talking in the ordinary,
unexplicated way about substituting senses. It is only by first displaying this
unexplicated way of speaking that we can consider ways of explicating it.
4.2 The particular worry: my appeal to sense
In the last subsection I offered an explanation of what it is for two subsentential
expressions to have the same sense, and that explanation was framed in terms of
substitution: subsentential expressions a and b have the same sense if and only if
substitutingb for a in a sentence always produces a sentencewith the same sense as the
original, and vice versa.23 But how should substitution be understood in this
explanation? Not as simple-substitution. ‘I’ and ‘me’ may well have the same sense,
but when we simple-substitute ‘I’ for ‘me’ in a sentence we usually end up with
something ungrammatical, and hence something that does not have any sense at all.
(Things only get worse when we consider synonymous expressions from different
languages.) So wemust be using a more sophisticated conception of substitution. And
it seems as though only one conception will do: sense-substitution! But now, doesn’t
my definition of sense-substitution run in a circle? I defined sense-substitution in terms
of subsentential expressions having the same sense, and then I explained what it is for
subsentential expression to have the same sense in terms of sense-substitution.24
It might be possible to avoid this circularity, but the prospects on this front seem
dim. There are only two strategies to try. First, we could try to offer a new
explanation of what it is for two subsentential expressions to share a sense that does
not proceed in terms of substitution. However, I simply have no idea of how to
develop such an explanation, at least so long as we refuse to reify senses. Second,
we could grant that any explanation of what it is for subsentential expressions to
have the same sense will involve substitution, but deny that this needs to be
understood as sense-substitution. But if not sense-substitution, then what? What
23 My improved explanation in footnote 22 was also framed in terms of substitution, and so all of the
following discussion applies to that explication as well.
24 Thanks to Peter Sullivan for pushing this objection.
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conception of substitution will fit the bill? Again, I do not know of any other kind of
substitution which could do this job.25
It may be, then, that I have no choice but to live with the circularity in my
definition of sense-substitution. Fortunately, however, that is something I think I can
do. There are two points that I want to make in this connection. First, what this
circularity shows us is that we can neither explain sense-substitution to someone
who has no inkling of what it is for subsentential expressions to share a sense, nor
explain what it is for subsentential expressions to share a sense to someone who has
no inkling of sense-substitution. The proper response to this predicament is not to
withdraw the definition of sense-substitution, but to reconsider the spirit in which
we lay it down. We cannot hope to explain the notions of sense and sense-
substitution to someone who has come to them cold; instead, all we can do is map
the pre-existing relations that hold between these two notions. Taken in this spirit,
my definition of sense-substitution is not an attempt to invent an all new notion of
substitution, but to articulate a notion of substitution that was already, if only tacitly,
essential to our notion of sense.
Second, the circularity in my definition of sense-substitution is most stark when
we are speaking in a very general way about what it takes for two arbitrary
expressions to have the same sense. But when we are discussing two particular
expressions, we can sometimes mitigate this circularity by bringing to bear special
assumptions about the senses of the expressions we are dealing with. This is a point
that I will exploit throughout Sect. 6.26
4.3 A final remark about sense
I have now said everything of substance I have to say about the notion of sense used in
this paper. But before ending this section, I would like to pause on a much more trivial
point. I have so far spoken naı̈vely as if we can say once and for all whether one
expression has the same sense as another. But of course, this is a simplification. An
expression has a sense only relative to a given language, as used by a particular speaker,
in a particular context, etc. etc. Nonetheless, it seems to me that simplicity is a virtue
here. I will, then, continue to suppress these complexities, and I will do so by assuming
that for the purposes of any given discussion, the senses of all the expressions under
consideration are held fixed. (For themost part I will leave it to the reader to decide how
the senses should be fixed.) I will also assume that whenwe hold their senses fixed, has
the same sense as is an equivalence relation over meaningful expressions.
25 I discuss one proposal in the ‘‘Appendix’’, and explain why I think it will not work.
26 In an earlier paper (Trueman 2012a), I criticised Dolby’s (2009) attempt to develop an account of
substitution via quantification. I objected that Dolby’s account was circular: in order to understand the
quantificational moves that Dolby wanted to make, we already need the very notion of substitution that
Dolby was trying to develop. At the time, I took it for granted that this circularity was vicious. Obviously
I can no longer maintain that stance, not now that I have been forced to acknowledge a similar circularity
in my own account.Nonetheless, I still think that Dolby’s account compares unfavourably to my own. As
we will see, we can put sense-substitution to substantial philosophical work, and it is not clear to me that
the same is true of Dolby’s notion of substitution. Unfortunately, however, I cannot pursue this matter any
further here.
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5 Everywhere and somewhere
Now that I have offered some defence of the sense in sense-substitution, I want to
work towards an argument for a version of (RP). I will start by trying to argue for
(RP2),
(RP2) Co-referring expressions are everywhere sense-intersubstitutable,
but as we will see, this is not quite the version of (RP) that we will end up with. I
should also mention now that what I will present will really only be a sketch of an
argument. At various points in this sketch, I will be forced to make more or less
controversial assumptions, and although I will try to offer some justification for
these assumptions, I simply will not have the space to make the case as watertight as
I would like. What follows will not, therefore, establish once and for all that a
version of (RP) is true; in the end, all I will do is present a way in which one might
try to argue for a version of (RP).
In an ideal world, we would argue for (RP2) simply by showing that it follows from
the definition of sense-substitution, but unfortunately, that is something we cannot do.
The definition of sense-substitution only tells us what is required for a sentence to
count as a result of sense-substituting b for a given occurrence of a; it does not by itself
tell us whether b can be sense-substituted for that occurrence of a. We will, then, need
something more than the definition of sense-substitution to get an argument for (RP2).
To that end, I would like to introduce the following principle:
ðÞ If c can be sense-substituted for a in UðaÞ but not for b inWðbÞ, then a 6 b.
We can offer the following argument for ðÞ:
Suppose that c can be sense-substituted for a in UðaÞ, but not for b in WðbÞ.
Sense-substitution is a way of substituting one sense for another. The sense of a
subsentential expression is its contribution to the senses of the sentences in which
it appears. So, sense-substitution is a way of substituting these contributions.
Thus, it is possible to substitute the contribution made by c for the contribution
made by a to the sense of UðaÞ, but impossible to substitute the contribution made
by c for the contribution made by b to the sense of WðbÞ. By Leibniz’s Law it
follows that the contribution made by a to the sense of UðaÞ is distinct from the
contribution made by b to the sense of WðbÞ. In other words, the sense of a in
UðaÞ is distinct from the sense of b in WðbÞ. And since we are holding the senses
of expressions fixed for the purposes of any given discussion, we can say more
simply: the sense of a is not the sense of b.27
27 An anonymous reviewer (the same one as before) pointed out to me that if this argument works, then it
can easily be re-worked to show the following:
If we can produce a true sentence by sense-substituting c for a in UðaÞ, and a false sentence by sense-
substituting c for b in UðbÞ, then a 6 b.
However, this further principle is by no means obviously correct: on the face of it, ‘a is a vixen because a
is a female fox’ is true and ‘a is a vixen because a is a vixen’ is false, even though (indeed, precisely
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On the face of it, accepting this argument requires thinking of senses as objects: all
the way through it we spoke as if senses could be referred to with singular terms—
we even invoked Leibniz’s Law! But, as I have emphasised several times now, I do
not want to assume that senses are objects in this paper. Nonetheless, I think that we
can still find this argument compelling, so long as we take it in the right spirit. What
it unproblematically shows is that according to our pre-explication thought about
senses, in which we think of senses as objects, the following claim is true:
ðyÞ If the sense of c can be substituted for the sense of a in the proposition
expressed by UðaÞ but not for the sense of b in the proposition expressed by
UðbÞ, then the sense of a is not the sense of b.
As I mentioned in Sect. 4.1, sense-substitution is meant to give us a way of
explicating our talk of substituting one sense for another without reifying senses;
this is how we should understand the claim that sense-substitution is a way of
substituting one sense for another. So, ðÞ should itself be seen as a way of
explicating ðyÞ without trying to reify senses. In summary, then, the above argument
works by establishing that ðyÞ is part of our pre-explication thought about senses,
and that ðÞ is a way of explicating ðyÞ.
Let us from now on take ðÞ as given. An immediate corollary of ðÞ is that if c
can be sense-substituted for some occurrence of a, then c can be sense-substituted
for every occurrence of a. To see this, just let b in ðÞ be identical to a:
If c can be sense-substituted for a in UðaÞ but not for a in WðaÞ, then a 6 a.
Since we are assuming that has the same sense as is an equivalence relation over
meaningful expressions, a must have the same sense as a. Hence we can infer that if
c can be sense-substituted for a in UðaÞ, then it can also be sense-substituted for a in
WðaÞ.
Straightaway, then, ðÞ makes our task easier. All we have to do to show that a
pair of co-referring expressions are everywhere sense-intersubstitutable is show that
they are somewhere intersubstitutable. Let us focus again on ‘Bertrand’ and ‘the
referent of ‘‘Bertrand’’ ’. Are these two terms somewhere sense-intersubstitutable?
Well, consider the following sentences:
(4a) ‘Bertrand’ refers to Bertrand
(4b) ‘Bertrand’ refers to the referent of ‘Bertrand’.
(4a) and (4b) are both meaningful; in fact they are both true. Moreover, they involve
no illicit pun: ‘ ‘‘Bertrand’’ refers to ð Þ’ has the very same sense in (4a) and (4b).
Footnote 27 continued
because) ‘ð Þ is a vixen’ has the same sense as ‘ð Þ is a female fox’. Unfortunately, I do not have the
means to address this kind of hypersensitivity in this paper (and that is not just because I lack the space!).
For now, all I can do is mention that I am sceptical of the idea that when ‘because’ is used in this
hypersensitive way, sentences of the form ‘p because q’ have any truth-conditions at all; rather than
saying something true, I suspect that ‘a is a vixen because a is a female fox’ acts as a kind of conceptual
aid, an instruction to connect up our concepts in a certain way.
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So, ‘Bertrand’ and ‘the referent of ‘‘Bertrand’’ ’ are somewhere sense-intersubsti-
tutable, and thus by ðÞ, they are everywhere sense-intersubstitutable.
At this point we might wonder whether this argument could be generalised into
an argument for (RP2). (4a) is an instance of the disquotation schema,
(D) ‘a’ refers to a,
and it is generally agreed that disquotation is somehow essential to reference. So
couldn’t we argue as follows?
Suppose that ‘c’ and ‘d’ co-refer. Since disquotation is essential to reference,
and ‘c’ and ‘d’ are referring expressions, both of the following instances of
(D) must be true:
(5a) ‘c’ refers to c.
(5b) ‘d’ refers to d.
As ‘c’ and ‘d’ co-refer, we can infer from (5a) and (5b) that the following
is true:
(5c) ‘c’ refers to d.
Now, if (5a) and (5c) are both true, then they must also both be meaningful.
So (5c) is a result of sense-substituting ‘d’ for ‘c’ in (5a). Thus ‘c’ and ‘d’ are
somewhere sense-intersubstitutable, and hence by ðÞ, they are everywhere
sense-intersubstitutable.
Unfortunately, however, this argument will not stand up to scrutiny. As we will see,
there is a problem with the way in which it appeals to disquotation, and although
there is a way around that problem, it leads us to another new version of (RP). But
before we can get to any of that, we need to pause on a preliminary discussion about
the sense-substitution of predicates.
6 Sense-substitution and predicates
We need some more terminology and notation. A monadic first-level predicate is
what you get when you remove a singular term from a sentence. More generally, an
n-adic first-level predicate is what you get when you remove n singular terms from a
sentence, but to keep things simple, I will focus on the monadic case. I will, then,
mean monadic predicates by ‘predicate’, unless I clearly indicate otherwise. We can
also remove first-level predicates from a sentence; when we do, we thereby produce
second-level predicates. Again, I will keep things simple by focussing on first-level
predicates, and so I will mean first-level predicates by ‘predicate’, unless I clearly
indicate otherwise. Since it can be useful to visually differentiate first-level
predicates from second-level ones, I will mark the gaps that result from removing
singular terms with a sans-serif ‘x’ or ‘y’, and the gaps that result from removing
monadic first-level predicates with a sans-serif ‘X’ or ‘Y’. So, for example, when we
remove the term ‘Shergar’ from ‘Shergar is a horse’, we get the first-level predicate
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‘x is a horse’, and when we remove ‘x is a horse’ from ‘9xðx is a horse)’, we get the
second-level predicate ‘9xðXxÞ’.28
So far in this paper, we have only considered examples of sense-substituting one
singular term for another. But we can also sense-substitute one predicate for
another. Take for example,
(6a) London is a city,
and imagine that we wanted to sense-substitute ‘x is crowded’ for ‘x is a city’. One
obvious choice is:
(6b) London is crowded.
(6b) counts as a result of sense-substituting ‘x is crowded’ for ‘x is a city’ in (6a) if,
(a) ‘X(London)’  ‘X(London)’
and (b) ‘x is crowded’  ‘x is crowded’,
both of which are trivial, given our assumption that  is an equivalence relation.
But again, (6b) is not the only result. The French sentence,
(6c) Londres est bondé,
also counts as a result of this sense-substitution so long as,
(a) ‘X(Londres)’  ‘X(London)’
and (b) ‘x est bondé’  ‘x is crowded’,
both of which look plausible.
We can, then, sense-substitute one predicate for another. But what we cannot do
is sense-substitute a predicate for a singular term. Suppose, for example, that we
wanted to sense-substitute ‘x is crowded’ for ‘London’ in (6a). To do so, we would
need to construct a meaningful sentence WðcÞ such that:
(a) Wð Þ  ‘x is a city’
and (b) c  ‘x is crowded’.
(a) and (b) tell us that Wð Þ and c both have the senses of first-level predicates. But
we cannot construct a meaningful sentence by writing an expression with the sense
of a first-level predicate into the gap in an expression that also has the sense of a
first-level predicate. First-level predicates are what you get when you remove
singular terms from sentences, and their senses reflect that fact. Roughly, singular
terms pick out objects, and first-level predicates say things of objects; for example,
in ‘London is a city’, ‘London’ picks out an object — London—and ‘x is a city’
says something of that object—that it is a city. But obviously, we cannot make the
senses of two first-level predicates work together in anything like this way. That is
28 To be absolutely clear: these sans-serif letters are not variables or schematic letters; they merely mark
the gaps in predicates. Frege used Greek letters like ‘n’ and ‘f’ rather than these sans-serif letters, but I am
already using Greek letters as metalinguistic variables ranging over expressions. And anyway, using the
same letters in different fonts a gap markers and as variables has the added benefit of allowing us to move
smoothly between them.
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why I have not marked the type of gap in Wð Þ: (a) tells us that Wð Þ is a first-level
predicate, WðxÞ, but (b) tells us that it cannot be.
It is worth pre-empting two possible misunderstandings here. First, we might
object that in the foregoing discussion, I must have assumed that predicates are not
referring expressions. Otherwise, I would have seen no obstacle to constructing a
meaningful sentence by writing a first-level predicate into the gap of another first-
level predicate: in the sentence WðcÞ, c picks out a particular property—the property
of being crowded—and Wð Þ says something of that property—that it is a city.29
But I made no such assumption. The problem with WðcÞ was that since c has the
sense of a predicate, at least part of its job is to say something of an object, and that
is something it cannot do in WðcÞ. This point still holds even if predicates are also
referring expressions.30 Indeed, the proposed way of understanding WðcÞ illustrates
that fact: clearly, c does not there serve to say something of anything.
Second, the above remarks are not meant to suggest that the only way to construct
a meaningful sentence with a first-level predicate is to fill its gap with a singular
term. Obviously, we can also write a first-level predicate into the gap in a second-
level predicate. But crucially, this is possible only because second-level predicates
have a different kind of sense from first-level predicates. Second-level predicates
are what you get when you remove first-level predicates from sentences, and their
senses reflect that fact. One of the things that second-level predicates do is supply
domains of objects for first-level predicates to say things of. Quantifiers are the
paradigms here. The first-order quantifiers ‘9xðXxÞ’ and ‘8xðXxÞ’ are second-level
predicates, and we are all familiar with the idea that these quantifiers come with a
domain of quantification: ‘9xðx is a horse)’ is true just in case ‘x is a horse’ says
something true of some object in the domain, and ‘8xðx is a horse)’ is true just in
case ‘x is a horse’ says something true of every object in the domain. But all second-
level predicates can be said to supply domains of objects for first-level predicates to
say things of. We can even say that ‘X(London)’, which is a sort of limiting case of
a second-level predicate, supplies such a domain, albeit one that includes only
London: when we plug ‘x is a city’ into ‘X(London)’ we get ‘London is a city’,
which is true just in case ‘x is a city’ says something true of the object in the domain
supplied by ‘X(London)’.31
In the last few paragraphs I have made a number of claims about how terms and
predicates function, about the different kinds of sense they enjoy.32 I hope that these
29 It seems to me that this line of thought is present in Magidor’s (2009: pp. 6–7).
30 For the record, I do think predicates refer, but I do not think that they refer in the same sense as
singular terms; in fact, I think that what it is for a predicate to refer is for it to say something of an object.
See Trueman (2015) and Sect. 7–9 of this paper. For an alternative conception of predicate reference, see
MacBride’s (2011: esp. Sect. 4).
31 And in case there is any doubt, the same can also be said in more complex cases. For example, the
second-level predicate ‘NxðXxÞ is even’ supplies a domain of objects for first-level predicates to say
things of: ‘Nx(x is a horse) is even’ is true just in case ‘x is a horse’ says something true of an even
number of objects in that domain.
32 In particular, I have been working with a broadly Fregean conception of terms and predicates. See
Sullivan’s (2010) for an excellent explanation of what is involved in that conception, although Sullivan
(pp. 116–117) ultimately expresses some reservations about it.
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claims are relatively uncontroversial, but I am sure that they are not so
uncontroversial that no philosopher would controvert them.33 Nonetheless, in what
follows I will take it for granted that the above reasoning is accepted, and thus that
predicates cannot be sense-substituted for singular terms.
7 Disquotation and reference
At the end of Sect. 5, I outlined an argument that we might try to give for (RP2).
That argument relied on the assumption that we always get a true sentence when we
substitute a referring expression into the following schema:
(D) ‘a’ refers to a.
That assumption was meant to be justified by the thought that disquotation is
somehow essential to reference. Now, I do not want to deny that there is some kind
of essential relationship between disquotation and reference. (Indeed, the main aim
of this section is to get clearer on what that relationship consists in.) Nonetheless, it
is important to note that substituting a referring expression into (D) does not always
yield a true sentence. Consider the following failed instances of (D):
(7a) ‘I’ refers to I
(8a) ‘Londres’ refers to Londres
(9a) ‘x is a horse’ refers to is a horse.
‘I’ and ‘Londres’ are certainly referring expressions, and many philosophers would
say that ‘x is a horse’ is as well, yet none of (7a)–(9a) are grammatical, let alone
true.
What should we say about these failed instances of (D)? Well, I hope that by now
it is obvious how to deal with (7a). Clearly, the problem here is that we simple-
substituted ‘I’ for the second ‘a’ in (D), and all we need to do to get around this
problem is sense-substitute ‘I’ for that ‘a’ instead. In other words, we just need to
sense-substitute ‘I’ into the gap in ‘ ‘‘I’’ refers to ð Þ’.34 If we continue to assume
that ‘I’ and ‘me’ have the same sense, then
(7b) ‘I’ refers to me,
will count as a result of this sense-substitution. What is more, (7b) is true, or at least
it is when the context is held fixed in the appropriate sort of way.35
33 Ramsey’s (1925: esp. 116) is sometimes read as a rejection of my broadly Fregean assumptions about
terms and predicates; however, this interpretation has been challenged by MacBride (2005).
34 I am speaking slightly loosely here. As I emphasised in Sect. 3, sense-substitution is defined only in
relation to meaningful whole sentences. This loose way of speaking is, however, harmless: to say that a
can be sense-substituted into the gap in Uð Þ is to say that a can be sense-substituted for b in any
meaningful sentence WðbÞ where Wð Þ  Uð Þ.
35 That is, (7b) will be true if I utter it and am saying what ‘I’ refers to when I use it, or if you utter it and
are saying what ‘I’ refers to when you use it, and so on.
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We can deal with (8a) in much the same way. (8a) is the result of simple-
substituting the French term ‘Londres’ into the English schema (D), and so it is
hardly surprising that it is ungrammatical. However, recalling a point made in
Sect. 3, the fact that ‘Londres’ is French and (D) is English does not mean that we
cannot produce a true sentence by sense-substituting ‘Londres’ into the gap in
‘ ‘‘Londres’’ refers to ð Þ’. Both of these sentences will surely do:
(8b) ‘Londres’ refers to London
(8c) ‘Londres’ se réfère à Londres.
But now we come to (9a), which is a much more difficult sort of case. Here we
cannot deal with the problem simply by moving over to sense-substitution.
Ordinarily understood, ‘refers to’ is a first-level predicate, ‘x refers to y’. For
example, in the sentence ‘ ‘‘Bertrand’’ refers to Bertrand’, ‘refers to’ is flanked by
‘ ‘‘Bertrand’’ ’, a term referring to the term ‘Bertrand’, and ‘Bertrand’, a term
referring to the man Bertrand. So the gap left open in ‘ ‘‘x is a horse’’ refers to ð Þ’
is a gap for singular terms: ‘ ‘‘x is a horse’’ refers to y’. But as we saw in Sect. 6,
predicates cannot be sense-substituted for singular terms, and so ‘x is a horse’
cannot be sense-substituted into that gap.
It might be tempting to say that all this shows us is that ‘x is a horse’ does not
refer to anything: disquotation is essential to reference, and so if we cannot disquote
‘x is a horse’ then it cannot be a referring expression. And had the problem been that
we end up with a false sentence when we sense-substitute ‘x is a horse’ into the gap
in ‘ ‘‘x is a horse’’ refers to y’, then this surely would have been the right response.
However, the problem is much more radical than that: no sentence, true or false,
results from sense-substituting ‘x is a horse’ into that gap. And as a result, I think, a
much more radical response is called for. We must draw a sharp distinction between
two kinds of reference: one for singular terms, expressed by ‘x refers to y’, and one
for predicates, expressed by something of the form ‘Rðx;YÞ’. I have argued for this
more radical response elsewhere,36 but I cannot reproduce that argument in all of its
detail here. Nonetheless, it would still be useful for me to try to give some sense as
to why I think that this more radical response is called for.
Let’s temporarily set ‘x is a horse’ to one side, and consider the empty singular
term ‘Vulcan’. Now, since ‘Vulcan’ is a term, we can sense-substitute it into the gap
in ‘ ‘‘Vulcan’’ refers to y’ without any difficulty: ‘ ‘‘Vulcan’’ refers to Vulcan’ will
do. Of course, since ‘Vulcan’ is an empty term, ‘ ‘‘Vulcan’’ refers to Vulcan’ is
false.37 Nonetheless, it is still true to say: If ‘Vulcan’ refers to something, then
‘Vulcan’ refers to Vulcan. Indeed, that seems to be almost analytically true.38 To
36 See Trueman (2015), Sect. 5.
37 Some philosophers (e.g. Frege 1892: pp. 156–157, 1897: pp. 229–230) have insisted that sentences
featuring empty names are not truth-evaluable. Unfortunately, this is yet another issue that lies beyond the
scope of this paper.
38 I say ‘almost analytically true’ because analytic truths are normally thought to be necessarily true, and
there are certainly readings of ‘If ‘‘Vulcan’’ refers to something, then ‘‘Vulcan’’ refers to Vulcan’ on
which it is not necessarily true: we could have used the word ‘Vulcan’ as a name for Mars.
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see this, suppose that ‘ ‘‘Vulcan’’ refers to something’ is true, but ‘ ‘‘Vulcan’’ refers
to Vulcan’ is not. In that case, the predicate ‘ ‘‘Vulcan’’ refers to y’ would have to
be satisfied by something other than what we refer to when we use ‘Vulcan’. Our
use of ‘ ‘‘Vulcan’’ refers to y’ would thus be cut free from our use of ‘Vulcan’ itself,
and as a result, it would no longer be possible to use ‘ ‘‘Vulcan’’ refers to y’ to
specify what ‘Vulcan’ refers to.
Now let’s return to ‘x is a horse’. As I said earlier, the problem is not merely that
we cannot produce a true sentence by sense-substituting ‘x is a horse’ into the gap in
‘ ‘‘x is a horse’’ refers to y’. The problem is that we cannot sense-substitute ‘x is a
horse’ into that gap at all. Consequently, we cannot sense-substitute ‘x is a horse’
into the gap in ‘If ‘‘x is a horse’’ refers to something, then ‘‘x is a horse’’ refers to y’
either. Now, we just said that if we could not produce a true sentence by sense-
substituting ‘Vulcan’ into the gap in ‘If ‘‘Vulcan’’ refers to something, then
‘‘Vulcan’’ refers to y’, then we could not use ‘ ‘‘Vulcan’’ refers to y’ to specify what
‘Vulcan’ refers to. By analogy, then, we must surely conclude that we cannot use
‘ ‘‘x is a horse’’ refers to y’ to specify what ‘x is a horse’ refers to: our use of ‘ ‘‘x is
a horse’’ refers to y’ simply is not tethered in the right way to our use of ‘x is a
horse’ itself.
This may at first seem like a bizarre thing to say, but what it really comes down to
is just this: we cannot talk about predicate reference in the same way we talk about
term reference; instead, we need to use a notion of reference that is tailor made for
predicates. In particular, we need to use a second-level version of reference,
expressed by a predicate of the form ‘Rðx;YÞ’; the first gap here, marked ‘x’, is a
gap for a term referring to a predicate,39 and the second gap, marked ‘Y’, is a gap
into which a predicate can be sense-substituted.40 Now, there is a good question
about which predicate of the form ‘Rðx;YÞ’ we should use to express this second-
level version of reference, but for present purposes it does not matter which one we
choose.41 For now, then, I will just use ‘x predicate-refers to Y’ as a new primitive
which is to express the notion of reference for predicates. (And when it is helpful, I
will also write ‘x term-refers to y’ instead of ‘x refers to y’.) We can now disquote
‘x is a horse’ as follows:
(9b) ‘x is a horse’ predicate-refers to is a horse.
(9b) might look ungrammatical as a piece of English, but ‘x predicate-refers to Y’ is
a new addition to English, and (9b) is grammatical by design.
39 I am here assuming that predicates are objects and so capable of being referred to by singular terms.
This assumption may well be mistaken, but nothing in my argument essentially turns on it: I want to focus
on the second gap in ‘Rðx;YÞ’, not the first.
40 I have just stretched my definition of sense-substitution even further. What does it mean to say that a
can be sense-substituted into the second of the two open gaps in Uð Þ1ð Þ2? This will do for now: a can
be sense-substituted for c in any meaningful sentence WðbÞ1ðcÞ2 where Wð Þ1ð Þ2  Uð Þ1ð Þ2. This
definition will no doubt need some work to make it generally applicable, but it will suffice for the cases
discussed below.
41 For the record, I would like to suggest that ‘8yðy satisfies x $ YyÞ’ is the right choice here, or at least I
would if we could agree to set intensional contexts aside for the time being. However, nothing in this
paper turns on this suggestion.
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As I warned, this is nothing more than the outline of an argument; it takes a great
deal of work to fill in all of the details. But in what remains, I will assume that its
conclusion is accepted: the claim that ‘x is a horse’ refers should be understood as
the claim that ‘x is a horse’ predicate-refers. However, it is again worth pre-empting
a possible misunderstanding here. Nowhere in this section have I argued that ‘x is a
horse’ actually predicate-refers to anything. In fact, for all I have said here, it may
be that no predicate predicate-refers to anything.42 The point was this. We need to
understand the claim that ‘x is a horse’ refers as the claim that ‘x is a horse’
predicate-refers so that we can meaningfully disquote ‘x is a horse’ with (9b). But
the fact that (9b) is meaningful does not by itself tell us that ‘x is a horse’ predicate-
refers to anything, any more than the fact that ‘ ‘‘Vulcan’’ term-refers to Vulcan’ is
meaningful tells us that ‘Vulcan’ term-refers to anything. ‘x is a horse’ predicate-
refers to something only if (9b) is not just meaningful but true as well.
8 One last Reference Principle
In Sect. 6 I argued that predicates cannot be sense-substituted for singular terms.
(RP2) would, therefore, have us conclude that terms and predicates do not co-refer.
But then, in Sect. 7, I argued that we need to distinguish between two notions of
reference: one for singular terms, expressed by ‘x term-refers to y’, and one for
predicates, expressed by ‘x predicate-refers to Y’. And when we do, we reach a far
more striking conclusion than the one issued by (RP2): rather than being false, it is
just nonsensical to say that a singular term term-refers to the same thing that a
predicate predicate-refers to.
If we wanted to say that a singular term, ‘c’, term-refers to the same thing that a
predicate, ‘Fx’, predicate-refers to, we would need to bind both the variables in,
(10) ‘c’ term-refers to y and ‘Fx’ predicate-refers to Y,43
with a single existential quantifier. But that is not something we can do. Just
imagine trying to form an instance of this generalisation. We would have to
substitute the one expression for both the variables in (10). Now, the notion of
substitution people usually have in mind when they talk about forming an instance
of a generalisation is simple-substitution, but in the current context that seems
wrongheaded. Better to use sense-substitution instead. So, we would need to sense-
substitute one expression for both the variables in (10). But no one expression can
be sense-substituted for both of these variables: we can sense-substitute a term but
not a predicate into the gap in ‘ ‘‘c’’ term-refers to y’, and we can sense-substitute a
predicate but not a term into the gap in ‘ ‘‘Fx’’ predicate-refers to Y’. It is not,
therefore, possible to form an instance of the generalisation that would result from
42 Nonetheless, if my earlier suggestion that we should read ‘x predicate-refers to Y’ as ‘8yðy satisfies
x $ YyÞ’ is right, then we cannot coherently deny that predicates refer. But that is a discussion for
another time.




binding both the variables in (10) with a single existential quantifier,44 and that
surely just means that it is not possible to form that generalisation in the first place.
Once again, it is worth pre-empting a possible misunderstanding here. It is
tempting to say that an existential generalisation is true only if we can produce a
true instance of that generalisation. But whether or not that thought is right,45 it was
not the thought underwriting the argument above. Rather, my thought was that we
cannot form a meaningful generalisation, true or false, unless we can produce a
meaningful instance of that generalisation. And that is a thought that I cannot
imagine gainsaying.
So it is nonsense, not false, to say that a term term-refers to the same thing that a
predicate predicate-refers to. This suggests that rather than working with (RP2), we
should move over to another new version of (RP). To formulate this new principle,
we will need some new notation. From now on, I will use ‘x refersa to ð Þ’ to
express the appropriate notion of reference for a; the first gap here, marked ‘x’, is a
gap for a term referring to a, and the second gap, whose type I have not marked, is a
gap into which a can be sense-substituted. The idea behind this notation is a
generalisation of what I said about predicate-reference in Sect. 7. I argued that if we
want to say the predicate ‘x is a horse’ does or does not refer to something, we need
to use a notion of reference that allows us to disquote ‘x is a horse’. But there is
nothing special about predicates: in general, then, if we want to say that an
expression a does or does not refer to something, we must use a notion of reference
that allows us to disquote a.46
We can now present our new version of (RP):
(RP3) If it makes sense to say that a refersa to what b refersb to, then a and b
are everywhere sense-intersubstitutable.47
What is more, we can actually offer an argument for (RP3). This argument has three
(schematic) premises:48
44 Some nominalists, who do not think that predicates refer, would say that it is impossible to bind the
variable ‘Y’ in ‘ ‘‘Fx’’ predicate-refers to Y’ with a quantifier at all. However, in Trueman (2012b), I
argue that even if predicates do not refer, we can still quantify into predicate position.
45 It turns out that this thought is a little more problematic than it might seem. See Levine (2013) for an
interesting discussion.
46 In case there is any confusion, I am not suggesting that every expression has its own unique notion of
reference. If a and b are everywhere sense-intersubstitutable, then I see no reason to deny that ‘x refersa
to ð Þ’ and ‘x refersb to ð Þ’ both express the same notion of reference.
47 Unlike (RP1) and (RP2), (RP3) must be read as a schema rather than a universal generalisation. That is
because ‘a’ and ‘b’ both play two roles in (RP3): they appear in the positions of terms and in undetachable
subscripts. In particular, (RP3) is intended to be a schematic generalisation over meaningful expressions,
i.e. expressions which have senses.
48 Like (RP3), Premises 2 and 3 must be read as schematic generalisations. And for the purposes of the
following argument, ðÞ may as well be a schema too.
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Premise 1
ðÞ If c can be sense-substituted for a in UðaÞ but not for b inWðbÞ, then a 6 b.
Premise 2
a can be sense-substituted into the second gap in ‘x refersa to ð Þ’.
Premise 3
If it makes sense to say that a refersa to what b refersb to, then it is possible to
sense-substitute a single expression into the gaps in both pA refersa to ð Þ q
and pB refersb to ð Þ q, where A is some term referring to a and B is some term
referring to b.49
Premise 1 is, of course, just ðÞ from Sect. 5. Premise 2 was built into the notation
of ‘x refersa to ð Þ’: ‘x refersa to ð Þ’ can express the appropriate notion of
reference for a only if we can sense-substitute a into its second gap.50 Premise 3 is
an application of the idea that we can form a generalisation only if it is possible to
form an instance of that generalisation. With these three premises, we can argue as
follows:
Suppose that it makes sense to say that a refersa to what b refersb to. It follows
from Premise 3 that we can sense-substitute one expression c into the gaps in both
pA refersa to ð Þ q and pB refersb to ð Þ q. Therefore, there is some possible
sentence Uð/Þ such that,
(a) Uð Þ  pA refersa to ð Þ q
and (b) /  c,
and there is another possible sentence WðwÞ such that,
(a) Wð Þ  pB refersb to ð Þ q
and (b) w  c.
By Premise 2 it is possible to sense-substitute a into the gap in pA refersa to ð Þ q,
and thus there is a possible sentence RðrÞ such that:
(a) Rð Þ  pA refersa to ð Þ q  Uð Þ
and (b) r  a.
49 The corner-quotes in this premise are Quine-quotes, which we cannot omit this time. Since Quine-
quotes can be a headache, it might be useful to give an example. Let a be ‘Bertrand’. A needs to be a term
referring to a, so let A be ‘ ‘‘Bertrand’’ ’. And let us abbreviate the reference-predicate for ‘Bertrand’ as
‘x refersB to ð Þ’. With all this in place, pA refersa to ð Þ q is ‘ ‘‘Bertrand’’ refersB to ð Þ’, and pA refersa
to aq is ‘ ‘‘Bertrand’’ refersB to Bertrand’.
50 Couldn’t there be a meaningful expression, a, for which there is no appropriate notion of reference?
Maybe. But in that case, the relevant instances of (RP3) will be vacuous: ‘x refersa to ð Þ’ will be
meaningless, and so it will not make sense to say that a refersa to what b refersb to. In what follows, then,




Similarly, by Premise 2 it is possible to sense-substitute b into the gap in pB
refersb to ð Þ q, and thus there is a possible sentence DðdÞ such that:
(a) Dð Þ  pB refersb to ð Þ q  Wð Þ
and (b) d  b.
It is now trivial that we can sense-substitute a for / in Uð/Þ: RðrÞ counts as a
result of this sense-substitution. And since /  c  w, it follows by ðÞ that we
can sense-substitute a for w in WðwÞ. So there is some possible sentence KðkÞ
such that:
(a) Kð Þ  Wð Þ  pB refersb to ð Þ q
and (b) k  a
Since Kð Þ  pB refersb to ð Þ q  Dð Þ, KðkÞ also counts as a result of sense-
substituting a for d in DðdÞ. And as d  b, it follows by ðÞ that a can be sense-
substituted for every occurrence of b.
So, from the supposition that it makes sense to say that a refersa to what b refersb to,
we can infer that a can be sense-substituted for every occurrence of b; and of course,
exactly the same reasoning will also allow us to infer from this supposition that b
can be sense-substituted for every occurrence of a. Thus we have (RP3).
9 Conclusion
I want to end now by returning to the easy arguments with which we started. On the
face of it, we seem to have gone a long way towards vindicating them: they used
(RP) to convert seemingly difficult questions into trivial ones, and we have just
argued for a version of (RP). However, this initial assessment is quite mistaken.
To begin with, part of what made those easy arguments seem so easy was that on
first glance, (RP) appeared to be a truism. But by now I hope that that appearance
has been completely dispelled. While we do have a sketch of an argument for (RP3),
that sketch is by no means trivial. I was forced to make a number of controversial
assumptions during the course of arguing for (RP3), and I cannot pretend that I have
given those assumptions a full defence here. Probably most notable in this regard is
my assumption that we must distinguish between different kinds of reference for
different kinds of expression. Everyone agrees that disquotation is somehow
essential to reference, but I am sure that plenty of philosophers will be resistant to
the idea that if we want to say that a does or does not refer to something, then we
must use a notion of reference that allows us to disquote a. Ultimately, I do not
believe that this idea can be resisted, but it would be absurd for me to suggest that I
have done enough to show that here. All I have done is present a way of trying to
argue for (RP3), and while that is not nothing, it is nowhere near the last word on the
subject.
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But let us set that issue to one side and just take (RP3) for granted. Still, the
supposedly ‘easy’ arguments are not all that easy: it can be very hard to figure out
whether two expressions are everywhere sense-intersubstitutable. This is a real
difference between (RP1) and (RP3). Simple-substitution is a mechanical procedure
that yields unique results. If we want to argue that b cannot be simple-substituted
salva congruitate for a in UðaÞ, then all we really need to do is write out UðbÞ; after
that, anyone fluent in the relevant language can see whether we are right. Sense-
substitution, on the other hand, is not mechanical and does not yield unique results.
If we want to argue that b cannot be sense-substituted for a in UðaÞ, then we need to
somehow show that no possible sentence could count as a result of this sense-
substitution.
It is, then, pretty difficult to show that two expressions are not everywhere sense-
intersubstitutable. But that is not to say that it is impossible. In Sect. 6 I tried to give
some reason for thinking that predicates cannot be sense-substituted for terms. I
think, then, that we can recover something from Easy Argument 1. That argument
tried to use (RP1) to show that the predicate ‘x is a horse’ does not co-refer with the
term ‘the property of being a horse’. We can now use (RP3) to show that it is not
even false to say that ‘x is a horse’ and ‘the property of being a horse’ co-refer; it is
just nonsense. (Although to my mind this gives us no reason to deny that predicates
refer in their own way.) But to repeat, what we have here can no longer be called an
‘easy’ argument. It is not just given that terms and predicates are not everywhere
sense-intersubstitutable; establishing that result requires substantial philosophical
work, work that I have only made a start on in this paper.
It is a lot harder to recover anything from Easy Argument 2. That argument
tried to use (RP1) to show that ‘that the show will be funny’ does not co-refer
with ‘the proposition that the show will be funny’. If we wanted to replace (RP1)
in that argument with (RP3), we would need to find some way of arguing that
‘that the show will be funny’ and ‘the proposition that the show will be funny’
are not everywhere sense-intersubstitutable. Now, as it happens, I think that it is
possible to supply such an argument,51 but there is no denying that this is still
very much a matter for debate. Indeed, for the time being we should even be
open to the possibility that (in at least some of its uses) ‘that the show will be
funny’ has exactly the same sense as ‘the proposition that the show will be
funny’; it may be that the grammatical differences between these expressions do
not reflect differences in their senses, just as it may be that the grammatical
differences between ‘I’ and ‘me’ do not reflect differences in their senses. If that
turned out to be right, then ‘that the show will be funny’ and ‘the proposition
that the show will be funny’ would be trivially sense-intersubstitutable. It takes a
lot of work, then, to decide whether (RP3) can be brought to bear on this case;
indeed, the work that needs to be done is of the very kind that Easy Argument 2
was meant to excuse us from.
51 See Trueman (2017).
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In the end it does not seem that we can use (RP) to subserve any easy arguments,
and really, that is what we should have expected. (RP1) operates on the surface of
language, which is why it is so easy to use. It invites us to draw substantial
philosophical conclusions from the surface features of particular natural languages.
But natural languages have too many quirks and idiosyncrasies at surface level to be
allowed the final say on philosophical matters. (RP3), on the other hand, runs much
deeper. It will not allow us to draw any philosophical conclusions until we have
shown that certain claims cannot be expressed in any language whatsoever, and that
is not an easy thing to do. Here I can do no better than to borrow a line from
Ramsey:
Let us remind ourselves that the task on which we are engaged is not merely one
of English grammar; we are not school children analysing sentences into subject,
extension of the subject, complement and so on, but are interested not so much in
sentences themselves, as in what they mean, from which we hope to discover the
logical nature of reality. (Ramsey 1925: p. 117)
Acknowledgments I would like to thank Tim Button, Nick Jones, Michael Price and Peter Sullivan for
all of their help with this paper. Thanks also to the anonymous reveiwer for this journal, who supplied a
very helpful set of comments.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were
made.
Appendix
In an exceptionally helpful set of comments, an anonymous reviewer for this journal
presented an alternative conception of substitution. Suppose we wanted to substitute
‘I’ for ‘Robert’ in ‘Robert is hungry’. On the anonymous reviewer’s account, the
first thing we do is step down from the surface-level sentence ‘I am hungry’, to the
corresponding phrase structure tree, which looks something like this:
Robert
is hungry
(The expressions written in bold here are lexical items, where a is the lexical item
corresponding to ‘a’.) We then simple-substitute I for Robert in this tree:




We then step back up from this tree to the corresponding surface-level sentence.
Importantly, this step back up will often involve some syntactic transformations. In
this particular case, we must transform the verb to make sure that it agrees with the
grammatical person of I. So what we end up with on the surface-level is not ‘I is
hungry’, but ‘I am hungry’, just as we should. And it is important to emphasise that
these kind of syntactic transformations are not ad hoc additions to deal with
substitution failures; it has always been understood that a system of syntactic
transformations will be needed to take us from a surface-level sentence to its tree,
and back again.52
Let’s call the anonymous reviewer’s version of substitution tree-level substitu-
tion. The first thing that the reviewer wanted to know was why we should prefer my
sense-substitution to their tree-level substitution. However, I do not think that these
two accounts of substitution are in competition at all: they work together, at
different levels of abstraction. Imagine someone asked why the reviewer’s account
of tree-level substitution should make us say that ‘I am hungry’, the surface-level
sentence itself, counts as a result of substituting ‘I’ for ‘Robert’ in ‘Robert is
hungry’. The answer would presumably be that this account shows that the surface
difference between ‘ð Þ am hungry’ and ‘ð Þ is hungry’ is semantically
insignificant: phrase structure trees are the primary objects of semantic evaluation,
and the surface difference between ‘ð Þ am hungry’ and ‘ð Þ is hungry’ does not
reflect any difference in the trees. But that is just another way of saying that these
predicates have the same sense.
My sense-substitution is, then, just an abstraction from tree-level substitution. I
skipped straight to the end of the story, which is what I take to be the most
philosophically interesting bit. What we are left with is a general, and very flexible,
notion of substitution. Of course, there is no sense in which a more abstract
definition of substitution is automatically better or worse than a more concrete one.
It all depends on the purposes you want to put it to. I would wager that sense-
substitution is far too abstract for most purposes in linguistics; for those purposes we
would be better off using something like tree-level substitution. But by contrast, I
think that tree-level substitution is too concrete, too concerned with linguistic
practicalities, for many philosophical purposes. At the very least, I hope that I
managed to convince you that sense-substitution can be put to useful philosophical
work over the course of this paper.
The anonymous reviewer had another question to ask about tree-level substi-
tution. As I explained in Sect. 4.2, my definition of sense-substitution seems to run
in a circle: I defined sense-substitution in terms of subsentential sameness of sense;
52 For an excellent textbook introduction to phrase structure trees and natural language semantics, see:
Heim and Kratzer (1998).
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then I defined subsentential sameness of sense in terms of substitution; but it seems
that the notion of substitution used in this last definition must be sense-substitution
itself! The reviewer wanted to know whether we could break out of this circle by
defining subsentential sameness of sense in terms of tree-level substitution. The
answer is, I think, that we cannot, but it is worth taking the time to see why.
If we were only dealing with one language, L, then we could use something like
tree-level substitution to define ‘a has the same sense in L as b’. We start by moving
from the surface-level of sentences in L to their phrase structure trees, and then say:
a has the same sense in L as b just in case simple-substituting whatever corresponds
to b for whatever corresponds to a never changes the interpretation of a tree, and
vice versa. (Depending on what a and b are, they may correspond to lexical items,
or they may correspond to subtrees.)
Importantly, however, this would not define a complex predicate, ‘has the same
sense in L as’ with ‘L’ as variable, but would instead define a simple predicate, ‘has-
the-same-sense-in-L-as’. That’s because there is no one general method for moving
from a surface-level sentence to its phrase structure tree, which could be applied
neutrally to sentences from any language whatsoever. Different languages call for
different transformations. So we would be left with a proliferation of synonymy
relations, without the means to say what they have in common. Worse still, this
whole approach goes no way towards explaining what it is for two expressions
drawn from different languages to share a sense.
The trouble here is precisely that tree-level substitution is too concrete for a
general definition of what it is for two expressions to have the same sense. We need
an account of substitution which is more abstract, which steps back from the details
of how any one language works. Of course, we have just such an account to hand,
but it is sense-substitution itself. It seems to me, then, that the circle I described in
Sect. 4.2 may well be unavoidable.
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